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Summary
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant factors
in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years.   In 2004,
Afghanistan was the source of 87% of the world’s illicit opium and heroin, in spite
of ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their
international partners to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking.  U.N.
officials estimate that in-country illicit profits from the record 2004 poppy crop were
equivalent in value to 60% of the country’s legitimate GDP, raising fears that
Afghanistan’s economic recovery is being underwritten increasingly by drug profits.
Across Afghanistan, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, and
corrupt government officials have exploited opium production and trafficking as
reliable sources of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these
groups pose to the country’s fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its
embryonic democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to
provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue
to operate in and around Afghanistan, including remnants of the Taliban regime and
some Al Qaeda operatives.  The issue is further complicated by an aspect of coalition
forces’ ongoing pursuit of security and counterterrorism objectives: frequent reliance
for intelligence and security support on figures who may be involved in the
production or trafficking of narcotics.
The failure of U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts to significantly
disrupt the Afghan opium trade or sever its links to warlordism and corruption since
the fall of the Taliban has led some observers to warn that without redoubled
multilateral action, Afghanistan may succumb to a state of lawlessness and reemerge
as a sanctuary for terrorists.  Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified
counternarcotics as the top priority for his administration and has stated his belief
that “the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.” U.S. and Afghan officials
are beginning to implement a new strategy designed to provide viable economic
alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt the corruption and narco-terrorist
linkages that threaten Afghanistan’s security and the success of recent
counterterrorism and reconstruction efforts. Preliminary field surveys and official
statements indicate that these new counternarcotics initiatives may have contributed
to a decrease in opium poppy cultivation in the current 2004-2005 growing season.
This report describes the structure and development of the narcotics trade in
Afghanistan and explores its relevance to Afghan, U.S., and international security
interests.  The report provides current statistical information on the opium trade,
profiles its various participants, explores alleged narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews
the U.S. and international policy response since late 2001.  The report also considers
current policy debates regarding the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics
operations, opium poppy eradication, alternative livelihood development, funding
issues for Congress, and pending legislation including S. 1042 and H.R. 1437.  The
report will be updated periodically.  For more information on Afghanistan, see CRS
Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy and
CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.
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Introduction
In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade,
U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan produced a world record opium poppy crop
in 2004 that supplied 87% of the world’s illicit opium.1  Afghan, U.S., and
international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking
constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan and
jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism and reconstruction efforts there.
In light of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the United States make a
long-term commitment to the security and stability of Afghanistan, counternarcotics
policy has emerged as a focal point of current debates in the Bush Administration and
in Congress concerning the United States’ key strategic objectives in Afghanistan and
the global war against terrorism.  Concerns include the role of U.S. military
personnel in counternarcotics activities and strategies for continuing the simultaneous
pursuit of counterterrorism and counternarcotics goals, which  may be complicated
by practical necessity: coalition forces pursuing regional security and
counterterrorism objectives often rely on the cooperation of commanders, tribal
leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade.
Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending
a highly-profitable enterprise that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,
political, and social fabric of a war-torn country.  Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse a growing tide of opium poppy
cultivation and heroin production and have begun implementing a multifaceted
counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns, judicial reform
measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction
operations, and more robust poppy eradication.  The Bush Administration and
Congress continue to consider options for upgrading U.S. support for
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in order to meet the challenges posed by the
Afghan opium economy to the security of Afghanistan and the international
community.  Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, and
implications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan are likely to arise as
such options are debated.
CRS-2
2 See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post,
November 2, 1978, and  Stuart Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and
Pakistan Supply West With Opium,” Washington Post, October 11, 1979.
3 UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, Jan. 2003.
Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Opium production has become an entrenched element of Afghanistan’s fragile
political and economic order over the last 25 years in spite of ongoing local, regional,
and international efforts to reverse its growth.  At the time of Afghanistan’s pro-
Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers produced
300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually — enough to satisfy most local and regional
demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose products were
bound for Western Europe.2  Since the early 1980s, a trend of increasing opium
poppy cultivation and opium production has unfolded during successive periods of
insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently, international
engagement (Figures 1 and 2).  In 2004, Afghanistan produced a world record opium
poppy crop that yielded 4200 MT of illicit opium — an estimated 87% of the world’s
supply.  Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone
of a multibillion dollar drug trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest
Asia and supplies heroin to consumption markets in Europe, Russia, the Middle East,
and the United States.3  Millions of Afghans remain involved with various aspects
of the opium trade, including farmers, laborers, traffickers, warlords, and government
officials. Some experts have warned that the consolidation of existing relationships
between these groups supports negative trends such as warlordism and corruption and
threatens to transform Afghanistan into a failed narco-state.
Record Opium Output
According to the 2004 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics
Directorate (CND): 
! Opium poppy cultivation took place in every province of
Afghanistan in 2004 (Figure 3). Afghan farmers cultivated opium
poppy on 131,000 hectares of land during the 2003-2004 growing
season, a 64% increase from the 80,000 hectares cultivated in 2003.
These figures do not include eradicated land area. The area under
cultivation was equal to 3% of Afghanistan’s arable land. U.S.
government estimates placed the area under cultivation at 206,000
hectares.
! The 2004 opium poppy crop produced 4200 MT of illicit opium, a
17% increase from the 3600 MT produced in 2003.  The increase in
opium output in 2004 was limited by crop disease, bad weather, and
an accelerated harvest linked to eradication fears.  A range of
accepted opium to heroin conversion rates indicate that the 2004
CRS-3
4 UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, November 2004, pp. 105-7.
5 See Barnett Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center for
International Cooperation, October 7, 2004, and the World Bank Country Economic Report -
Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty, September 9, 2004.
6 Author’s interviews with U.S., U.N., and coalition officials - Kabul, Afghanistan, January
2005; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Poppy Rapid Assessment Survey, February 2005.
opium harvest could produce 420 to 700 MT of refined heroin.4
U.S. government estimates placed the yield at 4,900 MT.
! An estimated 356,000 Afghan families cultivated opium poppy in
2004, a number equal to roughly 2.3 million people or 10% of the
Afghan population. An estimated 500,000 laborers and an unknown
number of traffickers, warlords, and officials also participate in the
trade.  Some experts believe that the number of opium laborers may
be as high as 1 million.
! The estimated $2.8 billion value of Afghanistan’s 2004 illicit opium
harvest is equivalent to approximately 60% of the country’s licit
GDP.  Many licit industries are financed or supported by profits
from narcotics trafficking.5
Current Production Statistics
Official statements and preliminary surveys collected in Afghanistan during late
2004 and early 2005 indicate that the area under opium poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan may decrease during the current 2004-2005 growing season.6 Afghan
President Hamid Karzai has predicted a 20% to 30% decline.  According to a
February 2005 UNODC survey, a “falling trend in opium poppy cultivation” has been
observed across Afghanistan due to a range of factors.  The report credits the public
outreach efforts of President Karzai, who has characterized opium as shameful and
demanded that regional and local officials take direct action to curb poppy cultivation
and opium trafficking in areas under their control. The report also indicates that
farmers fear crop eradication and expect poor opium crop output based on their 2004
crop yields.  Other observers have pointed to the steady increase in opium production
volume that has occurred since late 2001 and argued that excess opium supply has
continued to reduce raw opium price levels (Table 1) and price incentives for farmers
to cultivate poppy.  U.S. and Afghan authorities currently are employing a range of
technical assessment means to verify anecdotal reports and survey data. 
Experts have identified two factors that may affect Afghanistan’s future opium
output regardless of reported declines in cultivation. Intensified interdiction and
eradication efforts by Afghan authorities may fuel a renewed increase in opium prices
that could enrich traffickers who control large existing stocks of opium and
encourage farmers to resume cultivation in the future.  In addition, drought and crop
disease problems that limited the output of the 2004 poppy crop may not affect the
output of future poppy crops.  Smaller nationwide poppy crops may yield higher
opium outputs if weather and irrigation improve productivity in cultivated areas.
CRS-4
Note: The following figures display trends in poppy cultivation and opium
production in Afghanistan over the last 25 years.  The sharp decline in cultivation and
production in the 2000-2001 growing season is related to the Taliban regime’s
decision to ban opium poppy cultivation.  According to U.S. officials, opium
trafficking continued unabated during this period, and Taliban authorities collected
higher profits from the sale of opium and heroin stockpiles.
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Source: UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004.  U.S. government estimates place 2004 cultivation at 206,000
hectares.  Figures for 1986-1993 based on U.S. government estimates. Figures for 1994-2004 based on UNODC survey
data.  One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters.  The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their
control in 2001, but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks.
Limited cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.
Figure 1. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2004
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Figure 2.  Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1980-2004
Source: Graphic from UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, p. 4. One metric ton is equal to 2200 pounds.  U.S. government
estimates placed opium production at 4,950 metric tons.  The Taliban banned opium poppy  cultivation in areas under their control in 2001, but
allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks.  Limited cultivation continued in areas under
Northern Alliance control.
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Figure 3.  Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2004
Source: Map from UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, p. 13.
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Source: Map from UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Poppy Rapid Assessment Survey, February 2005, p. 10.
 
Figure 4. Expected Opium Poppy Cultivation Trend by Province, 2005
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7 In 1978, pro-Communist Afghan officials reportedly requested “a lot of assistance from
abroad, especially economic help, to help replace farmers’ incomes derived from opium
poppy cultivation.” Randal, Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1978.
8 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Agreement], December 5, 2001.
9 See Arthur Bonner, “Afghan Rebel’s Victory Garden: Opium,” New York Times, June 18,
1986, and Mary Thornton, “Sales of Opium Reportedly Fund Afghan Rebels,” Washington
(continued...)
Table 1.  Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan
(regionally weighted farmgatea price US$/kilogram)
1999 2000 2001b 2002 2003 2004 2005
Opium Price $40 $28 $301 $350 $283 $92 $186
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004.  Figure for
2005 from UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Poppy Rapid Assessment Survey, February 2005. 
a. Farmgate price is the price paid to farmers by traffickers. 
b. Dry opium prices skyrocketed to nearly $700/kg immediately following the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks and fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.
Historical Development
During the more than two decades of occupation, foreign interference, and civil
war that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation and drug
trafficking served as central parts of Afghanistan’s war economy, providing revenue
to individuals and groups competing for power and an economic survival mechanism
to a growing segment of the impoverished population.  In December 2001, Afghan
leaders participating in the Bonn conference that formed Afghanistan’s interim post-
Taliban government echoed pleas issued by their pro-Communist predecessors
decades earlier:7 They strongly urged that “the United Nations, the international
community, and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to
combat international terrorism, cultivation, and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide
Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop
production.”8  In spite of renewed efforts on the part of Afghan and international
authorities to combat opium poppy cultivation since the fall of the Taliban,
Afghanistan has reemerged as the world’s leading producer of opium.
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy.  Following the Soviet invasion
of 1979 and during the civil war that ensued in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal, opium poppy cultivation expanded in parallel with the gradual collapse
of state authority across Afghanistan.  As the country’s formal economy succumbed
to violence and disorder, opium became one of the few available commodities
capable of both storing economic value and generating revenue for local
administration and military supplies.  Some anti-Soviet mujahidin commanders
encouraged and taxed opium poppy cultivation and drug shipments, and, in some
instances, participated in the narcotics trade directly as a means of both economic
survival and military financing.9  Elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
CRS-10
9 (...continued)
Post, Dec. 17, 1983.  
10 See James Rupert and Steve Coll, “U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade: Rebels,
Pakistani Officers Implicated,” Washington Post, May 13, 1990; Jim Lobe, “Drugs: U.S.
Looks Other Way In Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Inter Press Service, May 18, 1990; John
F. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989; Kathy
Evans, “Money is the Drug” The Guardian (UK), Nov. 11, 1989; and Lawrence Lifschultz,
“Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, Nov. 14, 1988. 
11 The Taliban government collected an agricultural tax (approximately 10%, paid in kind),
known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic tithe known as zakat (variable percentages).  The
Taliban also taxed opium traders and transport syndicates involved in the transportation of
opiates.  UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 92, 127-8.
12 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 92.
13 In December 2001, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers stated that the Taliban had not banned opium cultivation
“out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too
much opium.” Marc Kaufman, “Surge in Afghan Poppy Crop Is Forecast,” Washington Post,
Dec. 25, 2001.  See Table 1 and UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan,  p. 57.
(ISI) agency and Afghan rebel commanders to which the ISI channeled U.S. funding
and weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics trade
during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production and
trafficking of refined heroin to U.S. and European markets.10  After the withdrawal
of Soviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation,
drug trafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders and
military commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishing
political influence in the areas they controlled.  
Taliban Era.  The centralization of authority under the Taliban movement
during the mid-to-late 1990s further fueled Afghan opium poppy cultivation and
narcotic production, as Taliban officials coopted their military opponents with
promises of permissive cultivation policies and mirrored the practices of their
warlord predecessors by collecting tax revenue and profits on the growing output.11
In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4500 MT of raw opium, which led to
growing international pressure from states whose populations were consuming the
end products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs.  In response, the
Taliban announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed the
opiate trade to continue, fueling speculation that the decision was designed to
contribute to their marginalized government’s campaign for international legitimacy.
Under the ban, opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically and overall opium
output fell to 185 MT, mainly because of continued cultivation and production in
areas under the control of Northern Alliance forces.  Individual Northern Alliance
commanders also taxed opium production and transportation within their zones of
control and continued producing opium and trafficking heroin following the Taliban
prohibition.12 Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded the
Taliban policy shift, most experts now believe that the ban was designed to increase
the market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintained
by the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.13
CRS-11
14 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001. 
15 Analysis in this report relating to the motives and methods of Afghan farmers, land
owners, and traffickers is based on the findings of the UNODC’s “Strategic Studies” series
on Afghanistan’s opium economy and a series of commissioned development reports by
David Mansfield, the Aga Khan Foundation, Frank Kenefick and Larry Morgan, Adam Pain,
and others. UNODC Strategic Studies reports are available at [http://www.unodc.org/
pakistan/en/publications.html]. Complete citations are provided in Appendix A.
16 David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and
Reality,” International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and
Cooperation, August 2001.
Post-Taliban Resurgence.  Following 9/11, Afghan farmers anticipated the
fall of the Taliban government and resumed cultivating opium poppy as U.S.-led
military operations began in October 2001. International efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan’s devastated society began with the organization of an interim
administration at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, and Afghan leaders
committed their new government to combat the resurgence of opium poppy
cultivation and requested international counternarcotics assistance from the United
States, the United Kingdom and others.14  The United Kingdom was designated the
lead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy in Afghanistan.
On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opium
poppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April
2002.  In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400
MT of opium, reestablishing Afghanistan as the world’s leading producer of illicit
opium. Since 2002, further government bans and stronger interdiction and eradication
efforts have failed to reduce poppy cultivation and opium output, although recent
reports suggest that a reduction may occur in 2005.
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Farmers, laborers, landowners, and traffickers each play roles in Afghanistan’s
opium economy.  Ongoing field research indicates that the motives and methods of
each group vary considerably based on their geographic location, their respective
economic circumstances, their relationships with ethnic groups and external parties,
and prevailing political conditions.15  Studies suggest that profit is not the universal
motivating factor fueling opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: opium trade field
researcher David Mansfield argues that the “great diversity in the socio-economic
groups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal”
ensures that “there is great disparity in the revenues that they can accrue from its
cultivation.”16  Household debt and land access needs also motivate opium poppy
cultivation.
Farmers.  Field studies have identified several structural barriers that limit the
profitability of opium poppy cultivation for the average Afghan farmer.  Many
Afghan farming households cultivate opium poppy in order to improve their access
to land, water, agricultural supplies, and credit — inputs that remain in short supply
in many of the rural areas where opium poppy is grown.  Experts have identified high
levels of household debt as a powerful structural determinant of the continuation of
opium poppy cultivation among some Afghan farmers.  An opium-for-credit system,
CRS-12
17 See UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation to
New Districts in Afghanistan,” June 1998. 
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known as salaam, allows farmers to secure loans to buy necessary supplies and
provisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low as
half their expected market value.  Crop failures that occurred as a result of a severe
four-year nationwide drought (1998-2001) reportedly caused many farming
households to accumulate large amounts of debt in the form of salaam loans based
on future cultivation of opium poppy.  In some cases, the introduction of strict poppy
cultivation bans and crop eradication policies by the Taliban in 2001 and the Afghan
Interim Authority in 2002 and 2003 increased the debt levels of many Afghan
farmers by destroying opium crops that served as collateral for salaam arrangements.
Although the Afghan government issued a decree banning opium-based loans
and credit in April 2002, the 2004 UNODC/CND opium survey reports that salaam
lending has continued.  Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and to
agree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements.
Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selection
choices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favor
opium poppy over other traditional crops.  According to experts, this combination of
drought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-
effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.
Land Owners.  Afghan land owners are better positioned to profit from opium
poppy cultivation because of the labor intensive nature of the opium production
process. Land owners who control vital opium cultivation inputs like land, water, and
fertilizers enjoy an economic advantage in the opium production cycle, which places
heavy demands on Afghanistan’s rural agricultural labor market during annual opium
poppy planting, maintenance, and harvesting seasons.  Wealthy land owners secure
the services of skilled itinerant laborers to assist in the complex opium harvesting
process, which improves their crop yields and profits.  Itinerant laborers, in turn,
contribute to the spread of opium cultivation expertise around Afghanistan.17
Although opium prices have fallen since reaching a peak of $350/kg in 2002, farmers
have experienced greater profit loss than land owners.18  Land owners also have
benefitted from consolidation of property related to rising debt levels among Afghan
farmers.  Land valuation based on potential opium yields also benefits land owners.
Traffickers.  International market prices for heroin and intermediate opiates
such as morphine ensure that individuals and groups engaged in the shipment and
distribution of refined opium products earn substantially higher profits than those
involved with cultivating and producing raw opium gum.19  Although opium refining
facilities that produce morphine base and heroin traditionally have been located in
tribal areas along the Afghan border with Pakistan, the growth and spread of opium
cultivation in recent years has led to a corresponding proliferation of opiate
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processing facilities, particularly into northeastern Badakhshan province.20  The
increasing proportion of heroin in the composition of drugs seized in countries
neighboring Afghanistan reflects this proliferation and suggests that the profitability
of opiate trafficking for Afghan groups has increased significantly in recent years.
The amount of heroin and morphine base seized by authorities in Central Asia has
increased substantially relative to seizures of unrefined opium gum (See Table 2).
Although Afghan individuals and groups play a significant role in trafficking
opiates within Afghanistan and into surrounding countries, relatively few Afghans
have been identified as participants in the international narcotics trafficking
operations that bring finished opiate products such as heroin to Middle Eastern,
European, or North American consumer markets.21 Ethnic and tribal relationships
facilitate the opium trade within Afghanistan, while relationships between ethnic
Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluchi Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia,
Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking needed to
deliver Aghan opiates to regional markets and into the hands of international
trafficking organizations.22  Some observers argue that trafficking profits are a source
of economic and political instability and that interdiction and prosecution should
precede eradication efforts so that increased post-eradication opium prices do not
enrich trafficking groups further. Multilateral intelligence gathering and interdiction
operations have been initiated since 2001 and are described in further detail below.
Table 2.  Balance of Narcotics Production as Reflected in
Seizures of Opiates in Central Asia
(percentages based on calculation in kilogram heroin equivalents)





Source: UNODC figures featured in Barnett Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium
Industry,” Center on International Cooperation/Center for American Progress, October 2004.
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Narcotics and Security
Experts and officials have identified three areas of concern about the potential
impact of the Afghan narcotics trade on the security of Afghanistan, the United
States, and the international community. Each is first summarized, and then more
fully developed below.  
! Prospects for State Failure: Afghan, U.S., and international
officials have identified several correlations between the narcotics
trade and negative political and economic trends that undermine
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, establish the rule of law, and restore
a functioning and licit economy.  These trends include corruption
and the existence of independent armed groups opposed to the
Afghan government’s reform and counternarcotics agendas.  Similar
drug-related trends threaten countries neighboring Afghanistan.
Election observers have warned that militia commanders, land
owners, and traffickers may seek to disrupt or corrupt Afghanistan’s
upcoming parliamentary, provincial, and district elections.
! “Narco-Terrorism”:  Afghan and U.S. officials believe that Taliban
insurgents and regional groups associated with Al Qaeda continue
to profit from Afghanistan’s burgeoning narcotics trade. Officials
also suspect that drug profits provide some Al Qaeda operatives with
financial and logistical support.  U.S. officials believe that financial
and logistical relationships between narcotics traffickers, terrorists,
and criminal groups pose threats to the security of Afghanistan and
the wider international community.
! Consumption and Public Health: World health officials believe
that Afghan narcotics pose social and public health risks for
populations in Afghanistan, its neighbors, Russia, Western Europe,
and, to a limited extent, the United States.  Increased use of Afghan
opiates has been closely associated with increased addiction and
HIV infection levels in heroin consumption markets. 
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan
Afghan authorities and international observers have identified negative trends
associated with the narcotics trade as barriers to the reestablishment of security, the
rule of law, and a legitimate economy throughout Afghanistan — goals which U.S.
and Afghan authorities have characterized as essential for the country’s long term
stability.  In a September 2004 report on Afghanistan’s economic development, the
World Bank described these related trends as “a vicious circle” (Figure 5) that
constitute “a grave danger” to the “entire state-building and reconstruction agenda.”23
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Figure 5.  Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence.  Authorities fear that
heavily armed trafficking groups and regional militia may join Afghan farmers in
violently resisting expanded drug interdiction and crop eradication efforts.  Opium
production remains a source of revenue and patronage for some armed groups and
militia leaders seeking to maintain their power and influence over areas of the
country at the expense of the extension of national government  authority.24
According to U.N. and Afghan officials, some armed groups impose informal taxes
and checkpoint fees of 10% to 40% on farmers, traffickers, and opiate processing
laboratories within their areas of control, receiving cash or payment in opium.25
Although much of the outright conflict between regional and factional militias that
motivated opium cultivation in the past has ended, long-established political and
commercial networks linking armed groups, landowning elites, transportation guilds,
and drug syndicates continue to constitute the foundation of the opium economy. 
Source: World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing
Poverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.
Fears of widespread violence are based in large part on a series of recent clashes
between Afghan farmers and counternarcotics authorities seeking to eradicate crops.
In April 2005, a large government eradication force clashed with approximately
2,000 villagers demonstrating against the destruction of opium crops in the southern
district of Maiwand, leading to the death of one security officer and the wounding of
several civilians.  Afghan soldiers and police also have been killed in 2005 by
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attackers firing on government eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar.  The
recent clashes and attacks follow a pattern evident in previous years, in which
eradication teams employed by provincial authorities faced demonstrations, small
arms fire, and mined poppy fields.26 At the outset of the Afghan government’s first
eradication campaign in April 2002, for example, Pashtun farmers barricaded the
major highway linking Pakistan and Afghanistan, and clashes between opium farmers
and Afghan eradication teams killed 16 people.27
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy.  According to the
State Department, national government officials are generally “believed to be free of
direct criminal connection to the drug trade,” although among provincial and district
level officials, “drug-related corruption is pervasive.”28 In December 2004, Afghan
counternarcotics official Mirwais Yasini indicated that “high government officials,
police commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade.29  Government
authorities and security forces in Afghanistan have accused each other of
involvement in opium production and trafficking, and militia commanders have
clashed over opium production and profits in various regions of the country,
threatening the country’s stability and the lives of civilians.30  Although most of
Afghanistan’s prominent political figures have publicly condemned the country’s
opium economy, some political figures and their powerful supporters are alleged to
have links with the trade or hold responsibility for areas of Afghanistan where opium
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking take place.  Commanders under the control of
former cabinet members and former presidential candidates are alleged to participate
in the opium trade.31  Some observers fear that as the Afghan government develops
stronger counternarcotics policies and capabilities, groups that are involved with the
opium trade will join others in seeking to corrupt or subvert Afghanistan’s
democratic process and upcoming parliamentary, provincial, and district elections.
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Although no major attempts were made to disrupt the Afghan national
presidential election on October 9, 2004, armed factions and local militia leaders
continue to exert political influence across Afghanistan.32  As authorities prepare for
national parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005, such influence
may become more pronounced and disruptive if local and regional politicians
involved in the opium trade become directly involved in the elections.  Some experts
have argued that drug money may finance the campaigns of candidates, and at least
one expert has warned that “drug lords are candidates.”33
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery.  Recent reports
indicate that profits from Afghanistan’s opium trade may be overwhelming efforts
to reestablish a functioning, licit economy.  According to the UNODC/CND 2004
opium survey, the value of the 2004 opium harvest, an estimated $2.8 billion, was
equal to 60% of the country’s licit GDP from 2003.  The World Bank reports that the
opium economy has produced significant increases in rural wages and income and
remains a significant source of credit for low income rural households. Opium profits
fuel consumption of domestic products and support imports of high value goods such
as automobiles and appliances from abroad.  Funds from the drug trade are also a
major source of investment for infrastructure development projects, including major
projects in “building construction, trade, and transport.”34  Analysts argue that efforts
to combat narcotics must address Afghanistan’s economic dependence on opium and
replace drug profits with licit capital and investment.  In February 2005, the IMF
warned that new counternarcotics efforts, if successful, “could adversely affect GDP
growth, the balance of payments, and government revenue” by lowering drug income
and weakening its support for domestic consumption and taxed imports.35
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism
Afghan and U.S. officials believe that linkages between insurgents, terrorists,
and narcotics traffickers threaten the security of Afghanistan and the international
community. In addition to moving deadly opiates, sophisticated drug transportation
and money laundering networks may also facilitate the movement of wanted
individuals and terrorist funds and support illicit trafficking in persons and weapons.
Although some U.S. officials have made unequivocal statements about the existence
of narco-terrorist linkages, most officials address the issue in general terms and
indicate that intelligence agencies are continually developing more complete pictures
of these relationships. According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leaders
considered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved in
managing and profiting from aspects of Afghanistan’s narcotics trade.  Ideological
considerations and fear of increased visibility and vulnerability to foreign intelligence
and law enforcement services reportedly were the predominant factors in their
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Table 3.  Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade
Afghan Extremists Are they receiving money from the
trade?
Do traffickers provide them with logistical
support?




Almost Definitely: HIG commanders
involved in trafficking have led attacks
on Coalition forces, and U.S. troops
have raided heroin labs linked to the
HIG.
Most Likely: HIG commanders involved in the
drug trade may use those ties to facilitate
weapons smuggling and money laundering.
Probably: Afghan Transitional
Authority officials say the Taliban
now encourages poppy cultivation,
and other extremist groups interested
in weakening the government in
Kabul — like the HIG — may be
following its lead.Taliban Almost Definitely: U.N. and Afghan
Transitional Authority officials report
the group earns money from trafficking
and gets donations form drug lords.
Most Likely: Major drug barons who supported
the Taliban when it was in power remain at
large, and may be moving people, equipment,
and money on the group’s behalf.
Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU)b
Probably: Uzbekistani officials have
accused the group of involvement in the
drug trade, and its remnants in
Afghanistan may turn to trafficking to
raise funds.
Probably: Members with drug ties may turn to
traffickers for help crossing borders.
Possibly: No reports, and these
groups — as foreigners in
Afghanistan  — may lack the moral
and political authority needed to
influence farmers’ planting decisions.
Al Qaeda Possibly: Only scattered reports, but
fighters in Afghanistan may be engaged
in low-level — but still lucrative —
drug deals.
Probably: Traffickers stopped last December
[2003] in the Arabian Sea were linked to Al
Qaeda.  Al Qaeda may hire professional
criminals in South Asia to transfer its weapons,
explosives, money, and people through the
region.
Source: Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 1, 2004.
a.  Hizb-i Islami’s leader — former anti-Soviet mujahidin commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — is alleged to have been involved in the Afghan narcotics trade since the 1980s.  
b.  The State Department’s 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism report indicates that the IMU is “closely affiliated” with Al Qaeda.  See also Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and Religion
Mask Drug Trafficking in Central Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2000. 
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Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers.  Afghan individuals serve as middlemen
between the groups described in Table 3 and narcotics producers and traffickers. 
Press reports and U.S. officials have identified two prominent figures involved in
Afghanistan’s drug trade that reportedly have financed Taliban insurgents and some
low-level Al Qaeda operatives:
! Haji Bashir Noorzai is a former confidant of ousted Taliban leader
Mullah Omar who served as a military commander during the
Taliban era and was reportedly a “major financial supporter of the
Taliban.”37  In a February 2004 statement to the House Committee
on International Relations, Congressman Mark Kirk alleged that Haji
Bashir Noorzai’s Kandahar-based trafficking organization reportedly
supplied some Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan with significant
amounts of heroin.38  In June 2004, the Bush Administration added
Haji Bashir Noorzai to the U.S. government’s drug kingpin list.  In
April 2005, Noorzai was arrested by DEA officials and charged with
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States over a 15-year
period. The indictment charges that Noorzai and his organization
“provided demolitions, weaponry, and manpower to the Taliban” in
return for “protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories,
drug-transportation routes, and members and associates.”39
! Haji Juma Khan has been identified as an alleged drug lord and Al
Qaeda financier.  In August 2004, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Robert
Charles told Time Magazine that Haji Juma Khan is “obviously very
tightly tied to the Taliban.” Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate
chief Mirwais Yasini added that “there are central linkages among
Khan, Mullah Omar and [Osama] Bin Laden.”40
U.S. forces reportedly detained and released both Haji Juma Khan and Haji
Bashir Noorzai in late 2001 and early 2002.  Press accounts state that Noorzai
voluntarily provided intelligence about his Taliban and Al Qaeda colleagues during
questioning at Kandahar’s airport prior to his release.41  DEA officials reportedly
were unable to question him at the time.42  Noorzai’s forces later surrendered a large
number of weapons to coalition and Afghan authorities and provided security for
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Qandahar province governor Gul Agha Sherzai.43  Juma Khan remains at large, and
Department of Defense officials indicate that U.S. military forces are not directly
pursuing major figures in the Afghan opium trade, although U.S., Afghan, and
coalition authorities continue to monitor and collect intelligence on their activities
and support Afghan authorities and their operations.44
Consumption Markets
Afghan opium presents significant public health and internal security challenges
to downstream markets where refined heroin and other opiates are consumed,
including the United States.  Russia and Europe have been the main consumption
markets for Afghan opiates since the early 1990s, and estimates place Afghan opium
as the source of over 90% of the heroin that enters the United Kingdom and Western
Europe annually.  Russian and European leaders have expressed concern over the
growth of Afghanistan’s opium trade as both a national security threat as well as a
threat to public health and safety. 
Trafficking to the United States.  Heroin originating in southwest Asia
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroin
available in the United States” from 1980 to 1987,45 and the DEA’s Heroin Signature
Program has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to
10% of the heroin available in the United States.46  Since the 1980s, several figures
involved in the Afghan drug trade have been convicted of trafficking illegal drugs,
including heroin, into the United States.47 Afghan and Pakistani nationals have been
indicted and convicted on heroin trafficking and money laundering charges in U.S.
courts as recently as April 2005. In addition to the case of Haji Bashir Noorzai noted
above, the following other recent cases involve links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
! In the mid-1990s, several Pakistani nationals were extradited to the
United States and convicted of heroin and hashish trafficking,
including Haji Ayub Afridi, a former member of Pakistan’s
Parliament and alleged drug baron.48
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! Since 2001, DEA and FBI investigators have prosecuted several
Afghan and Pakistani nationals in connection with heroin trafficking
and money laundering charges, including members of Pakistan’s
Afridi clan.49  Officials have indicated that some of the individuals
involved in these recent cases may have relationships with Taliban
insurgents and members of Al Qaeda.50  
! Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been captured
trafficking large quantities of heroin and hashish and attempting to
trade drugs for Stinger missiles.51
Russia.  Afghan opiates have been a concern for Russian leaders since the
1980s, when Afghan drug dealers targeted Soviet troops and many Russian soldiers
returned from service in Afghanistan addicted to heroin.52  More recently, the Russian
government has expressed deep concern about “narco-terrorist” linkages that are
alleged to exist between Chechen rebel groups, their Islamist extremist allies, and
Caucasian criminal groups that traffic and distribute heroin in Russia.  Since 1993,
HIV infection and heroin addiction rates have skyrocketed in Russia, and these trends
have been linked to the influx and growing use of Afghan opiates.  These concerns
make the Afghan narcotics trade an issue of priority interest to Russian decision
makers, and motivate attention and initiative on the part of Russian security services
in the region. In March 2005, the head of Russia’s counternarcotics service
announced plans to open a counternarcotics field office in Kabul by the end of the
year.53
Western Europe.  In Europe, press outlets and public officials in several
countries have devoted significant attention to Afghanistan’s opium trade since the
1990s.  In the United Kingdom, where British officials estimate that 90-95% of the
heroin that enters the country annually is derived from Afghan opium, the public
places a high priority on combating the Afghan opiate trade.  In October 2001, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair cited the Taliban regime’s tolerance for opium cultivation
and heroin production as one justification for the United Kingdom’s involvement in
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the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan.  Some British citizens and officials
have criticized the Blair Administration’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and
argued that more should be done to stem the flow of Afghan opiates in the future.54
The United Kingdom currently serves as the lead nation for international
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assist
Afghan counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operations
for interdiction and eradication.
Regional Security Implications
Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges for
Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union.  As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge of
securing their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics and
infiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups.  Regional terrorist organizations
and international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the region
have been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.55  As a
public health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiate
use and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also has
been linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’s
neighbors.  According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost
100% of the illicit opiates consumed in... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian
Federation.”56  With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is
the dominant driver of growing HIV infection rates in each of these countries.57
These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attention
to and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such as
Iran and Pakistan.  
Central Asia.58  The emergence of the so-called “Northern Route” of opiate
trafficking through Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-1990s transformed the
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region’s previously small and relatively self-contained opiate market into the center
of global opium and heroin trafficking.  Ineffective border control, civil war, and
corruption facilitated this trend, and opiate trafficking and use in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan now pose significant security and public
health threats to those countries. U.S. officials have implicated the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan in the regional drug trade, as well as well-organized and heavily armed
criminal syndicates that threaten U.S. interests.  
Tajikistan has emerged as the primary transit point for Afghan opiates entering
Central Asia and being trafficked beyond.  From 1998 to 2003, Tajikistan’s Drug
Control Agency seized 30 MT of drugs and narcotics, including 16 MT of heroin.
U.N. authorities estimate that the European street value of the 5,600 kg of heroin
seized by Tajik authorities in 2003 was over $3 billion.59  The 201st Russian Army
Division stationed troops along the Afghan-Tajik border to disrupt the activities of
criminals, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups from 1993 through late 2004.
Tajik and Russian authorities have begun replacing these Russian military forces with
Tajik border security guards and are scheduled to complete the process by the end of
2006.60  Some observers have expressed concern that the relatively poor training and
inexperience of the Tajik forces may result in an increase in the flow of opium and
heroin into Central Asia and onward to Russia and Europe. Others fear that Tajik
security forces may prove more vulnerable to corruption than their Russian
counterparts.61  In January 2005, Russian press sources reported that Russian border
guards seized 2.5 MT of heroin on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004.
Pakistan.  According to the 2005 State Department International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), “Pakistan remains a substantial trafficking country
for heroin, morphine, and hashish from Afghanistan,” and Pakistani narcotics
traffickers “play a very prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade” in regions of
Afghanistan that border Pakistan. Trafficking groups routinely use western areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan as staging areas for the movement of opiates into and
through Iran. Efforts to control the narcotics trade in Pakistan have historically been
complicated by the government’s limited ability to assert authority over autonomous
tribal zones, although recent cooperative border security efforts with the United
States have increased the presence of government authorities in these regions.   The
Pakistani government’s efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production since 2001 have been moderately successful; however, drug usage
remains relatively high among some elements of Pakistani society.  In March 2003,
former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House International
Relations Committee panel that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
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agency in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”62 The 2003 State
Department INCSR stated that U.S. officials have “no evidence” that any senior
government officials were involved with the narcotics trade or drug money
laundering, although the report also stated that narcotics remained a source of
“persistent corruption” among lower level officials.
Iran.  Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security and
public health risks to Iran, which the State Department has called “a major transit
route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan.” According to the 2003 State
Department INCSR, over 3200 Iranian security personnel have been killed in clashes
with heavily-armed narcotics trafficking groups over the last twenty years, and 67%
of HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by the country’s more
than 1 million estimated addicts.  Iran’s interdiction efforts along its eastern borders
with Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely credited with forcing opiate traffickers to
establish and maintain the “Northern Route” through Central Asia.  According to the
State Department, Iranian officials seized 181 MT of opiates in the first six months
of 2004. 
The 2005 INCSR states that the Iranian government “has demonstrated
sustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics,
including cooperation with the international community.”  Although the absence of
bilateral diplomatic relations prevents the United States from directly supporting
counternarcotics initiatives in Iran, the INSCR indicates that United States and Iran
“have worked together productively” in the UN’s multilateral “Six Plus Two” group.
Shared interest in interdiction has led the United Kingdom to support the Iranian
government’s counternarcotics efforts since 1999 by providing millions of dollars in
grants for security equipment purchases, including bullet-proof vests for Iran’s border
patrol guards.63
The International Policy Response
The Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority committed
Afghanistan’s new government to cooperation with the international community “in
the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.”64  After taking office in early
2002, Hamid Karzai’s transitional administration took a series of steps to combat the
growth of the Afghan narcotics trade, including issuing a formal ban on opium
cultivation, outlining a national counternarcotics strategy, and establishing
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institutions and forces tasked with eradicating poppy crops and interdicting drug
traffic.  Karzai’s government places a high priority on creating alternative livelihoods
and sources of income for opium growing farmers.  Many countries have contributed
funding, equipment, forces, and training to various counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan, including crop eradication and judicial reform. The United States and
others work closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in an effort to contain the flow of
narcotics and strengthen interdiction efforts. 
The United Kingdom serves as the lead coalition nation for international
counternarcotics policy and assistance in Afghanistan.  Under British leadership,
basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood development measures
began in the spring of 2002.  The State Department’s INL Bureau administers U.S.
counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs in Afghanistan and
coordinates with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Government of Afghanistan, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). To date, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have engaged in some
counternarcotics activities based on limited rules of engagement, although military
officials indicate that the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics has expanded
in 2005 to include police training and interdiction mission support.  British military
units carry out interdiction missions in cooperation with Afghan authorities that
target drug production laboratories and trafficking infrastructure. The United States
also provides counternarcotics assistance to other countries in the region. 
The Bush Administration has begun a new “five pillar” inter-agency initiative
to reinvigorate U.S. support for the implementation of Afghanistan’s national
counternarcotics strategy. The initiative calls for a substantial increase in spending
on counternarcotics programs, with particular emphasis on alternative livelihood
development and greater U.S. support for crop eradication efforts.  Training and
equipment of Afghan counternarcotics forces and prosecution teams also figure
prominently in the new strategy.  Most observers and officials expect that a long-
term, sustained international effort will be necessary to reduce the threat posed by the
opium trade to the security and stability of Afghanistan and the international
community.
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements.  Among the first acts of the
newly established Afghan Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement was the
issuance of a decree that banned the opium poppy cultivation, heroin production,
opiate trafficking, and drug use on January 17, 2002.  On April 3, 2002, Afghan
authorities released a second decree that described the scope and goals of an
eradication program designed to destroy a portion of the opium poppy crop that had
been planted during late 2001. In order to prevent further cultivation during the
autumn 2002 planting season, the government issued a third, more specific decree in
September 2002 that spelled out plans for the enforcement of bans on opium
cultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse.
Religious and political leaders have also spoken out adamantly against
involvement in the drug trade. Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s General Council
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of Ulema issued a fatwa or religious ruling in August 2004 that declared poppy
cultivation to be contrary to Islamic sharia law.65  Following his election in October
2004, President Hamid Karzai has made a number of public statements characterizing
involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking as shameful and stating that
provincial and district leaders would be held accountable by the central government
for failure to combat drug activity in areas under their control.
Afghan authorities developed a national counternarcotics strategy in 2003 in
consultation with experts and officials from the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the UNODC.66  The strategy declares the Afghan government’s commitment to
reducing opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008 and to completely eliminating
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking by 2013.  The strategy identifies five key
tactical goals to support its broader commitments: “the provision of alternative
livelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers, the extension of drug law enforcement
throughout Afghanistan, the implementation of drug control legislation, the
establishment of effective institutions, and the introduction of prevention and
treatment programs for addicts.”  In 2005, the Afghan government released an
implementation plan for the strategy that outlines specific initiatives planned in each
of the five policy areas, as well as for regional cooperation, eradication, and public
information campaigns.67
Institutions and Forces.  In October 2002, then-Interim President Hamid
Karzai announced that the Afghan National Security Council would take
responsibility for counternarcotics policy and would oversee the creation and
activities of a new Counternarcotics Directorate (CND). The CND subsequently
established functional units to analyze data and coordinate action in five areas:
judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihood development, demand
reduction, and public awareness.  Following its establishment in late 2002, the CND
worked with other Afghan ministries, local leaders, and international authorities to
develop counternarcotics policies and coordinate the creation of counternarcotics
institutions and the training of effective personnel.  The CND was transformed into
a new Ministry of Counternarcotics in December 2004.  Habibullah Qaderi currently
serves as Afghanistan’s minister for counternarcotics.
Counternarcotics enforcement activities have been directed from within the
Ministry of Interior since 2002.  General Mohammed Daud was named Deputy
Ministry of Interior for Counternarcotics in December 2004.  General Daud and his
staff work closely with U.S. and British officials in implementing the Afghan
government’s expanded counternarcotics enforcement plan.  The Ministry of Interior
directs the activities of the following Afghan counternarcotics and law enforcement
entities.
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! Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A).  The CNP-A
consists of investigative and enforcement divisions whose officers
work closely with U.S. and British counternarcotics authorities.
CNP-A officers continue to receive U.S. training to support their
ability to plan and execute counternarcotics activities independently.
! National Interdiction Unit (NIU).  The NIU was established as an
element of CNP-A in October 2004 and has conducted several
significant raids across Afghanistan in early 2005.  Approximately
100 NIU officers have received U.S. training and now operate in
cooperation with DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST
teams, for more see below).  Plans call for a 200-officer NIU force
to be in place by the end of 2005.68 
! Central Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC).  The CPEC is a U.K.-
supported targeting and intelligence center that uses sophisticated
technology and surveying to target poppy crops and monitor the
success of eradication operations.  The CPEC provides target data
for the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).
! Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).  The U.S.-supported
CPEF conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops throughout
Afghanistan based on targeting data provided by the Central
Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The force is made up of
approximately 1,000 trained eradicators and is supported by security
personnel. Plans call for 3,000 CPEF officers to be trained by the
end of 2005.69 
! Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF).  The elite ASNF, or
“Force 333,” has received special training from the British military
and carries out interdiction missions against high value targets and
in remote areas.  The U.S. military provides some intelligence and
airlift support for the ASNF.
! Border Police, National Police, and Highway Police.
Approximately 27,000 Afghan police have graduated from U.S.-
sponsored training facilities, and elements of all three forces have
received training, equipment, and communications support from
British, German, and U.S. authorities to improve their
counternarcotics enforcement capabilities.  U.S. and German
authorities plan to train 50,000 border and national police by
December 2005.
CRS-29
70 David Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,”
Washington File, U.S. Department of State, Nov. 17, 2004.
71 Ibid.
72 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, Aug. 3,
2004.
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan
In spite of limited efforts on the part of Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities, the land area used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and
Afghanistan’s corresponding opiate output increased annually from late 2001 through
2004.  Although public awareness of government opium poppy cultivation bans and
laws outlawing participation in the narcotics trade is widespread, until recently,
counternarcotics enforcement activities have been hindered by the Afghan
government’s tactical inability to carry out nationwide, effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns as well as a lack of adequate legal infrastructure to support
drug-related prosecutions.  International development agencies have made positive,
but limited, efforts to address structural economic issues associated with rural
livelihoods and drug production, such as household debt and the destruction of local
agricultural market infrastructure.  However, until recently, these efforts have not
been centrally coordinated or linked directly to counternarcotics goals and initiatives.
Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking since
late 2003 has led U.S. officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition
partners, to develop a more comprehensive, complementary plan to support the
implementation of the Afghan national counternarcotics strategy.  The new policy
initiative developed by U.S. agencies consists of five key elements, or pillars, that
mirror Afghan initiatives and call for increased interagency and international
cooperation.70  The five pillars of the new U.S. initiative are public awareness,
judicial reform, alternative livelihood development, interdiction, and eradication.
New initiatives in these areas are building upon a range of preexisting policy
initiatives being implemented by U.S., Afghan, and coalition authorities.  
Public Awareness.  Afghan and U.S. authorities have initiated a new public
information campaign to reach out to ordinary Afghans and raise public awareness
about the threat of narcotics and the danger of participation in the illegal drug trade.71
The effort builds on the Afghan government public awareness strategy, which enlists
local community and religious leaders to support the government’s counternarcotics
policies and encourages them to speak out in their communities against drug use and
involvement the opium trade.  As noted above, Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s
General Council of Ulema have supported this effort by publicly condemning poppy
cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.72  
The U.S. campaign supplements existing public information efforts designed to
reduce demand for illegal drugs within Afghan society and spread awareness of the
Afghan government’s opium poppy cultivation bans and drug laws.  The UNODC
February 2005 Rapid Assessment Survey found that farmers across Afghanistan were
well aware of the government’s ban on opium poppy cultivation but also reported
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that farmers in provinces where opium poppy cultivation was found to have increased
believed that the government could not or would not enforce the ban.
Judicial Reform.  New judicial reform efforts are being made to further
enable Afghan authorities to enforce counternarcotics laws and prosecute prominent
individuals involved in narcotics trafficking. A Counternarcotics Vertical Prosecution
Task Force (CNVPTF) is under development and will feature integrated teams of
Afghan judges, prosecutors, and enforcement officials that are being specially trained
to handle complex, high-profile cases.  Some U.S. federal prosecutors are
participating in CNVPTF training activities in Afghanistan.  As of April 2005, an
Afghan team of ten investigators, seven prosecutors, and three judges were active and
were serving under the jurisdiction of the Kabul criminal court.  Reconstruction
efforts are planned for the creation of a maximum-security wing at the Pol-i-Charki
prison near Kabul to hold narcotics offenders prosecuted by the Task Force.  Afghan
and coalition officials are currently working to identify targets for prosecution,
although, according to U.S. officials, political concerns and security considerations
will play a role in the targeting of individuals.
The April 2005 arrest of major drug figure Haji Bashir Noorzai by U.S. officials
raised concern about the readiness and ability of Afghan authorities to investigate,
prosecute, and incarcerate drug suspects.  According to an Afghan Interior Ministry
official, “Afghan police had no role in his arrest,” and Afghan authorities were
constrained because of “a lack of concrete evidence against him.”73  Discussion of a
limited amnesty program for prominent narcotics traffickers surfaced in January 2005
but is reportedly no longer under consideration.74 Afghan authorities also are
considering an amendment to existing counternarcotics provisions that would serve
as a new basic anti-drug law.
Alternative Livelihood Development.75  In order to provide viable
economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and drug production, U.S. officials
have developed a three-phased plan that directly links development initiatives to
overall counternarcotics efforts through a comprehensive program targeted to opium
producing areas.  The first phase of the alternative livelihoods plan calls for an
acceleration of existing agricultural development initiatives, including improvements
to agricultural market infrastructure, farmer education programs, and micro-credit
lending systems to support rural families.  The new efforts build on existing USAID
programs to develop integrated systems of crop processing facilities, storage areas,
roads, and markets, and to restore wheat and other cereal crop production levels.
Work began on phase one projects in early 2005 and will continue through 2006.
The second phase of the plan consists of a one-year “immediate needs”/ “cash-
for-work” program that is sponsoring labor intensive work projects to provide non-
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opium incomes to rural laborers and to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure.  The
program began in December 2004 and is scheduled for completion in November
2005; it may be renewed in 2006.  USAID personnel design “immediate needs”
projects in consultation with local councils and tribal leaders in districts where crop
eradication has been planned or where farmers have agreed to cease poppy
cultivation.76  According to USAID, in the main opium producing provinces of
Nangarhar and Helmand, close to 30,000 thousand laborers are engaged in a series
of irrigation and drainage system rehabilitation projects designed to create job
opportunities and improve the ability of local farmers to grow non-poppy cash crops.
USAID reports state the program’s goal is “to have paid $20 million in wages and
created 5 million days of work in the Provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar” by
November 2005.77  
The third, “comprehensive development” phase of the plan is scheduled to be
implemented from mid-2005 through 2009 in key poppy-producing provinces.
Planned projects include long-term infrastructure development for urban and rural
areas, credit and financial services expansion, agricultural diversification, and private
investment support.  The Afghan government has requested that USAID expand its
alternative livelihood programs into the provinces of Ghor, Dai Kundi, Konar, Farah,
and Uruzgan by the end of 2005, and USAID personnel are consulting with
contractors and security officials on initial projects scheduled for introduction to
those provinces from July 2005 onward.  A Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund has been
established to manage international donations for alternative livelihood programs and
judicial and law enforcement reform.  Since the fall of the Taliban, Japan and Iran
have provided funding to support agricultural development efforts in Afghanistan.
The British Department for International Development also sponsors research on
rural livelihoods and the implementation of alternative livelihood programs,
including cash-for-work activities in the remote northern province of Badakhshan.78






Province Share  of
Nationwide Poppy
Cultivated Area
Nangarhar and Laghman $18 $110 21.1%
Helmand and Kandahar $19 $120 34.2%
Badakhshan and Takhar $1.5 $60 8.6%
Source: USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 2, March 16 — 31, 2005.
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Interdiction.  Reflecting on the absence of effective counternarcotics
institutions and authorities in post-Taliban Afghanistan, international authorities led
by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a series
of cooperative interdiction initiatives in countries neighboring Afghanistan beginning
in early 2002.  The primary U.S.-led effort, known as “Operation Containment,” is
designed to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of
their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs,
precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.”79  Operation Containment
has continued since early 2002 and currently involves “nineteen countries from
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe and Russia.”80  According to the DEA, Operation
Containment activities were responsible for the seizure of “2.4 metric tons of heroin,
985 kilograms of morphine base, three metric tons of opium gum, 152.9 metric tons
of cannabis, and 195 arrests” in the first quarter of 2005.81 A similar multinational
DEA-led effort named Operation Topaz has focused on interdicting acetic anhydride
— a primary heroin production precursor chemical — to Afghanistan.
In addition to ongoing international narcotics and precursor interdiction
initiatives under Operation Containment and Operation Topaz, U.S. officials are
providing increased support to Afghan government interdiction efforts through
intelligence cooperation, training programs, equipment transfers, and joint
operations.  The DEA has expanded its presence in Afghanistan since January 2003,
although in the past DEA officials have cited restrictions on the capabilities and
freedom of movement of their staff in Afghanistan due to a general lack of security
outside of Kabul.  On November 17, the DEA announced plans to deploy DOD-
supported Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) to Afghanistan “to provide
guidance and conduct bilateral investigations that will identify, target, and disrupt
illicit drug trafficking organizations.” FAST teams have been deployed to
Afghanistan with Defense Department support and are currently conducting
operations and providing mentoring to newly-trained Afghan recruits. 
U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will not directly target drug production
facilities or pursue drug traffickers as part of the new U.S. initiative.82  Current rules
of engagement allow U.S. forces to seize and destroy drugs and drug infrastructure
discovered during the course of routine military operations.83  U.S. forces continue
to provide intelligence and air support to Afghan and British forces during
interdiction missions, including the destruction of heroin laboratories and opiate
storage warehouses.  U.S. initiatives that supply Afghan counternarcotics and border
police with tents, boots, communication equipment, and training are expected to
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continue.  Defense Department and military personnel plan to focus future efforts on
further improving Afghanistan’s border security and providing greater intelligence
support to Afghan law enforcement officials through  joint military/DEA/Afghan
“intelligence fusion centers” located at U.S. facilities in Kabul and the Afghan
Ministry of Interior.84 
British forces currently contribute to a central targeting operation that identifies
opiate warehouses and processing facilities for destruction.  British Customs and
Excise authorities also work with Afghan officials through mobile heroin detection
units in Kabul.  British military forces reportedly will operate under more permissive
rules of engagement that will allow them to carry out “opportunistic strikes” against
narcotics infrastructure and to support Afghan eradication teams with a “rapid-
reaction force.”  British officials also have discussed proposals to transfer 5,000
troops to the major opium growing provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in 2006,
when the United Kingdom is scheduled to assume control over provincial
reconstruction teams there.85 
Eradication.  Critics have cited growth in opium poppy cultivation figures as
evidence that manual eradication campaigns have failed to serve as a credible
deterrent for Afghan farmers.  Plans developed by the Department of State, in
consultation with Afghan authorities, called for early and more robust opium poppy
eradication measures for the 2004-2005 growing season to provide a strong deterrent
to future cultivation. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) carried
out limited operations with support from U.K. intelligence officers, U.S. advisors,
and international contractors in early 2005.  Field reports indicated that CPEF
personnel met violent resistance from farmers in some instances and largely failed
to meet their eradication targets for the 2004-2005 season.86  
The centrally organized and executed eradication plan marked a departure from
previous eradication campaign strategies, which largely relied upon governors and
local authorities to target and destroy crops.  Most governors pledged to support
President Karzai’s eradication initiatives in 2005, and U.S. officials report that areas
where governors and local leaders embraced and enforced the central government’s
eradication demands saw significant reductions in poppy cultivation.  In the past,
governor-led eradication has received some criticism because of uneven enforcement
and charges of corruption (i.e. reports that some governors allowed opium growth in
some areas, while demanding bribes or eradicating the fields of political opponents).
Prior to 2005, accounts also surfaced of low-yield or diseased crops being targeted
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for destruction in order to meet quotas and minimize backlash from local farmers.87
Field observations demonstrated that previous compensation plans encouraged some
Afghans to resume or increase future opium poppy cultivation in the hope of
receiving cash payments for the eventual eradication of their crops.
Issues for Congress
Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking may
jeopardize the success of international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.
U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related trends of opium cultivation,
drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader strategic
objectives are to be achieved. A broad interagency initiative to assist Afghan
authorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, but the effectiveness
of new U.S. efforts will not be apparent until later this year.  Primary issues of
interest to the Congress include program funding, the role of the U.S. military, and
the scope and nature of eradication and development assistance initiatives.  The 108th
Congress addressed the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan in intelligence
reform proposals, and the 109th Congress is considering counternarcotics policy
proposals in relation to FY2006 appropriation and authorization requests. 
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle
As noted above, narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately
linked across Afghanistan.  U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a
primary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be a
primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations.  Critics of existing
counternarcotics efforts have argued that Afghan authorities and their international
partners remain reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groups
involved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead to
internal security disruptions or armed conflict with drug-related groups. Afghan
authorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade will
resist attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internal
instability caused by counternarcotics measures” must be balanced “with the
requirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics purposes.88
Conflict and regional security disruptions have accompanied recent efforts to expand
crop eradication programs and previous efforts to implement central government
counternarcotics policies.
U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as
prerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, while
simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability.89
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Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, and
counternarcotics authorities are being trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the size
and capability of Afghan forces may limit their power to effectively challenge
entrenched drug trafficking groups and regional militia in the short term. Specifically,
questions remain as to whether Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alone
will be able to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robust
eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. and
Afghan officials. From a political perspective, U.S. officials expect that
parliamentary and provincial elections will contribute to the political legitimacy of
government counternarcotics initiatives; however, the creation of sufficient political
and military stability for effective counternarcotics operations is likely to remain a
significant challenge.  The death of several local contractor employees working on
USAID alternative livelihood projects in May 2005 brought renewed urgency to these
concerns.
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
In pursuing counterterrorism objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities also
must consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militia
leaders, and narcotics traffickers.  Regional and local militia commanders with
alleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in coalition efforts to
undermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly in
southeastern Afghanistan.  Since late 2001, some of these figures have been
incorporated into government and security structures, including positions of
responsibility for enforcing counternarcotics policies.90  According to Afghanistan
scholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who allied
with the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authority
now enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers,” have provided the opium
trade “with powerful new protectors.”91  
Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to prioritize counterterrorism operations
and current plans to enforce counternarcotics policies more strictly may conflict with
each other, forcing Afghan and coalition authorities to address seemingly difficult
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94 S.Rept. 109-69.
contradictions.  “Tactical” coalition allies in militia and other irregular forces with
ties to the drug trade may inhibit the ability of the central government to extend its
authority and enforce its counternarcotics policies.  These issues may weigh strongly
in decision concerning the feasibility and prospects for success of continuing
counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.  One senior Defense Department
official recently argued that U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan must
recognize “the impact the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while
complementing (and not competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those
objectives.”92 
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military
Some observers have argued that U.S. and coalition military forces should play
an active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the opiate trade.
Although U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials have indicated that “the
DoD counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign
against terrorism,”93 military officials reportedly have resisted the establishment of
a direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  Critics
claim that a direct enforcement role for U.S. or coalition forces may alienate them
from the Afghan population, jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism missions that
require Afghan intelligence support, and divert already stretched military resources
from direct counter-insurgent and counterterrorism operations.  According to the
Defense Department, U.S. military forces are authorized to seize narcotics and related
supplies encountered during the course of normal stability and counterterrorism
operations. A total of 19 seizures were reported by U.S. forces in Afghanistan from
July 2004 to March 2005.  
Current U.S. policy calls for an expanded role for U.S. military forces in
training, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift support for Afghan
counternarcotics teams but stops short of elevating narcotics targets to a direct
priority for U.S. combat teams. The Senate version of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Bill (S. 1042) would authorize “the use of U.S. bases of operation or
training facilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan,”
in response to the Defense Department’s request “to provide assistance in all aspects
of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including detection, interdiction, and related
criminal justice activities.”94  Section 1033 of S. 1042 would allow the Defense
Department to provide a range of technical and operational support to Afghan
counternarcotics authorities based on provisions of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101- 510, Section 1004).  This would
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Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (UK) to the
Seventh Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, September 2004.
96 Office of the Spokesperson to the President — Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,
“About the Commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcotics
and Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy Fields.”
include transportation of personnel and supplies, maintenance and repair of
equipment, the establishment and operation of bases and training facilities, and
training for Afghan law enforcement personnel. 
Redefining Eradication
Proponents of swift, widespread eradication argued that destroying a large
portion of the 2004-2005 opium poppy crop was necessary in order to establish a
credible deterrent before opium production in Afghanistan reaches an irreversible
level. Critics of widespread, near-term eradication argued that eradication in the
absence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers would
contribute to the likelihood that farmers would continue to cultivate opium poppy in
the future by deepening opium based debt and driving up opium prices.95  U.S. and
Afghan authorities maintain that the Central Poppy Eradication Force and governor-
led eradication programs have been effective in deterring and reducing some opium
poppy cultivation in 2005. However, given recent clashes between eradication forces
and farmers, some observers and officials have expressed concern about the safety
and effectiveness of current ground-based eradication efforts.  Some officials have
indicated that future “poppy elimination” strategies may rely on early season, locally-
executed eradication designed to minimize violent farmer resistance and give
families time to plant replacement cash crops.
Aerial Eradication.  Policy makers are likely to engage in further debate
concerning the option of aerial poppy eradication and its possible risks and rewards.
Afghan and U.S. authorities discussed the introduction of aerial eradication to
Afghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 due
to financial, logistical, and political considerations.  Afghan President Hamid Karzai
has expressed his categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, citing public
health and environmental safety concerns.96  Proponents of aerial eradication argue
that the large amount of rural land under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and poor
road infrastructure makes ground-based eradication inefficient and subjects
eradication teams to unnecessary security threats.  Critics of aerial eradication argue
that the mixed-crop cultivation patterns common throughout Afghanistan will expose
legitimate food crops to damage and warn that aerial spraying may produce
widespread, possibly violent resistance by villagers with vivid memories of centrally
directed Soviet military campaigns to destroy food crops and agricultural
infrastructure.  The Senate report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill
(H.R. 1268) specifies that “none of the funds recommended by the Committee may
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be available for aerial eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formal
request by the President of Afghanistan seeking such support.”
Reports of unauthorized aerial spraying in eastern Nangarhar province in mid-
November 2004 angered Afghan officials and led to an investigation by the Afghan
Ministries of Agriculture and Health of claims that crops had been sprayed with
herbicides by unidentified aircraft.  The government investigation reportedly revealed
that unidentified chemicals were present in soil samples, that non-narcotic crops had
been destroyed, and that an increase in related illnesses in local villages had occurred.
Afghan officials cited U.S. control of Afghan airspace in their subsequent demands
for an explanation. U.S. and British officials have denied involvement in the spraying
and assured Afghan authorities that they support President Karzai’s position.97 In
early December 2004, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad suggested
that “some drug-associated people” may have sprayed the crops “in order to create
the sort of distrust and problem between Afghanistan and some of its allies.”98
Observers noted that the vocal negative reaction of the Afghan population and
government to an alleged isolated spraying incident illustrates the type of popular
opposition that may accompany any future aerial eradication program.
Afghan government officials would have to approve any future aerial spraying
operations undertaken by U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Any future aerial
eradication in Afghanistan also would require specific funding and the introduction
of airframes and military support aircraft that exceed current U.S. capabilities in the
region.  Aerial eradication programs, if employed in the future, could feature the use
of chemical herbicide such as the glyphosate compound currently approved for use
in Colombia. The use of mycoherbicides, or fungal herbicides, also has been
discussed in recent congressional testimony.99  Opium poppy-specific mycoherbicide
has been developed with U.N., U.K., and U.S. support at the Institute of Genetics and
Experimental Biology, a former Soviet biological warfare facility in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.100  Mycoherbicide tests continue, including efforts by USDA’s
Agricultural Research Service , although USDA officials and others have expressed
various concerns about the use of mycoherbicides for counternarcotics purposes.101
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very real image problems... the use of any agent like this would be portrayed as biological
warfare.” USDA response to CRS inquiry, Oct. 19, 2004.
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding
Several intelligence reform proposals in the 108th Congress sought to address
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on expanding the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan’s security and stability, including U.S. counternarcotics efforts.  Section
7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108 —
458) states the sense of Congress that “the President should make the substantial
reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the
Global War on Terrorism” and calls on the Administration to provide a secure
environment for counternarcotics personnel and to specifically target narcotics
operations that support terrorist organizations.  The act also requires the submission
of a joint Defense and State Department report within 120 days of enactment that
describes current progress toward the reduction of  poppy cultivation and heroin
production in Afghanistan and provides detail on the extent to which drug profits
support terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and around Afghanistan.
In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1437, the “Afghan Poppy Eradication and Prosperity
Act of 2005,” would authorize $1 billion to support a two-year USAID-led cash for
work and poppy eradication pilot program in Afghanistan. Under the program,
Afghan laborers would receive $10 per day of work.  As noted above, cash for work
programs are currently being administered by USAID and British authorities in
Afghanistan.  The bill would require an annual report from USAID on progress
toward poppy eradication and alternative livelihood creation. The bill has been
referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
Helicopter Purchases and FY2005 Requests.  A specific State
Department request to reprogram $28 million in FY2005 INCLE funding to support
the purchase of helicopters for use in joint U.S./Afghan interdiction missions was
held up by the House Committee on International Relations.  An original State
Department proposal requested reprogramming of funds to purchase 14 Bell 212
helicopters from the government of Israel at a cost of $2 million per aircraft.  Some
Members objected to the plan because the helicopters were purchased by Israel using
U.S. Foreign Military Sales assistance, and out of concern that Afghan farmers may
object to Israeli aircraft being used by Afghan government counternarcotics forces.
Others have advocated for the purchase of refurbished U.S. Huey II helicopters as an
alternative to the Israel-owned Bell 212 aircraft.  
Defense Department officials agreed in March 2005 to provide limited airlift
assistance (four operations per month) to U.S. and Afghan interdiction teams using
U.S. Blackhawk and Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters.  Successful interdiction operations
in remote areas have been carried out on this basis since mid-March 2005, and further
helicopter leasing and pilot training arrangements have been made. The Senate report
on the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (S.Rept. 109-52) recommended shifting
$44 million of the $46.5 million requested for operation and maintenance of
helicopters to a pilot program to train local Afghan police forces.  Under the terms
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of the Senate report, the Department of State is required to submit a proposal for this
training program to the Senate Committee on Appropriations by July 1, 2005.  
Counternarcotics Funding.  Funding for U.S. counternarcotics operations
in Afghanistan consists of program administration costs and financial and material
assistance to Afghan counternarcotics authorities. Table 4 (below) displays the
funding appropriated for U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan and related
regional programs from FY2002 through FY2005, and includes the President’s
budget request for FY2006.  Table 5 (below) describes the Administration’s proposed
use for the counternarcotics funding included in the FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13), which provides $758.15 million of the $773.15 million
in supplemental FY2005 counternarcotics funding originally requested by the
Administration. Under the terms of P.L. 109-13, the Comptroller General must
conduct an audit of the use of all Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funds for bilateral counternarcotics and alternative
livelihood programs in Afghanistan obligated and expended during FY2005.
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Table 5.  U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source, FY2002-FY2005 and FY2006 Request 
($ million)





















Department of State $3.00a $60.00 $3.00a $25.00 - $170.00b $50.00c $89.28 $260.00 $260.00
Department of Defense - - - - - $73.00 - $15.40 $242.00 -
Drug Enforcement Agencyd ($0.58) - ($2.92) - - ($3.96) - ($7.67) $7.65 $79.20e 
USAIDf - $9.99 $14.29 - $53.55 - - $95.69 $248.50 $94.50g
Annual Total $73.57 $45.21 $350.51 $966.19 $433.70
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development - Budget Justifications to the Congress, Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign
Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense - Defense Budget Materials, Office of Management and Budget, and Legislative Information System.
a $3 million funding for Southwest Asia Initiative counternarcotics programs in Pakistan partially designed to restrict the flow of Afghan opiates. 
b Of the $170 million in supplemental funds, $110 million was channeled toward police training and judicial reform programs.
c Reprogrammed funds appropriated as part of $40 billion Emergency Response Fund established in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
d On May 8, 2002, Congress approved a reprogramming of 17 positions and $15,125,000 in Violent Crime Reduction Program prior year funds to support the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s ‘Operation Containment,’ which targets heroin trafficking in Southwest Asia.  The figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect annual
expenditure of the reprogrammed obligated funds.  (DEA response to CRS request, October 2004.)
e Requested funds for FY2006 will support “rightsizing DEA’s overseas presence, including resources to address the threat of Afghan heroin and to operate effectively
in Central Asia and the Middle East.”  (Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2006, Appendix: Department of Justice.)
f USAID funding figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect funds applied to USAID’s “Agriculture” and “Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” programs (Program #306-
001).
g USAID will shift activities currently funded through its”Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” program to a “Thriving Economy Led by the Private Sector”
program (Program #306-YYY).  Relevant requested funds include $91.5 million to “Develop and Expand Alternative Development” and $3 million to “Increase
Agricultural Productivity” through continued Rebuilding Agricultural Market Program (RAMP) projects.
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Table 6.  Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13
($ million)
Agency Amount Proposed Purpose
Department of Defense
(Drug Interdiction and 
Counter-Drug Activities)
$242
Funds for training, equipment, intelligence, infrastructure, and information operations related to the campaign
against narcotics trafficking and narcotics-related terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the Central Asia area.
Of this amount, $70 million will restore funding to other DoD counternarcotics activities from which funds
were used to finance counter-drug assistance to Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 limits the provision of assistance to
$34 million for the Afghan government and allows for the delivery of individual and crew-served weapons for
counter-drug security forces.  (Note: The Administration’s original request was for $257 million.)
Department of State
(International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement Account)
$260
Funds to continue the expanded counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan begun in FY2005. Of the total amount
requested, $95 million will replenish funding advanced to start this expanded effort in the areas of crop
eradication, establishment of a National Interdiction Unit, prosecution of drug traffickers, and public
information programs. The remaining $165 million will support the Department of State’s contribution to the
expanded efforts in eradication ($89 million), interdiction ($51 million), law enforcement ($22 million), and
public information ($3 million). 




Funds to support alternative livelihoods programs. A portion ($138.5 million) of the amount will replenish
reconstruction and development aid accounts that had been drawn on previously to create alternative livelihood
programs in late 2004 and early 2005. The balance ($110 million) will be used to expand alternative livelihood
programs beyond pilot provinces.  
Drug Enforcement Agency $7.65
Funds to support and equip DEA’s Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) and to provide operational
support for a 100-member Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU).
Total FY2005 
Supplemental Appropriation $758.15
Source: P.L. 109-13 and Office of Management and Budget, Estimate #1: Emergency Supplemental — Ongoing Military Operations in the War on Terror;
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